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Taking a Look at the Modern Takings Clause
Jurisprudence: Finding Private Property
Protection Under the Federal
and Utah Constitutions*
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution
both contain provisions which restrict government's ability to
infringe upon private property interests. The Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution provides: "[Plrivate property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."' The Utah Constitution has a similar provision: "Private
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just om pens at ion.''^ At first glance, these constitutional provisions seem simple, yet courts have struggled to establish a
consistent interpretation and application of their protections.
This Comment explores the United States Supreme Court's
analysis in interpreting and applying the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause, and examines the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in applying the Utah Constitution's corresponding provision.
Part I1 of this Comment presents a condensed overview of
modern takings analysis, briefly outlining the analytical steps
followed in applying both the federal provision and the Utah
provision. This part is designed to serve as a quick reference
for the practitioner who is exploring takings questions. Part I11
gives a detailed explanation of the United State Supreme
Court's Takings Clause analysis, examining the fundamental
theories that have driven the evolution of its modern interpretation. Part XV examines in detail the Utah Supreme Court's
analysis of takings questions under article I, section 22 of the
Utah Constitution. While the Utah court's analysis is signifi-

* Copyright@ 1994 by David W. Tufts. B.S.C.E. 1992, Brigham Young
University; J.D. candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. The author wishes to thank John Fellows for providing the incentive to
produce this Comment.
1. U.S. CONST.amend. V.
2. UTAHCONST.art. I, $ 22.
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cant, it does not match the United States Supreme Court's
analysis in either complexity or breadth.

A. The United States Supreme Court's Analysis Under the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause3
In applying the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, the
United States Supreme Court follows a bifurcated analysis,
applying one analysis to regulations that deny a n owner economically viable use of her land and another to regulations
that do not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.
Accordingly, governmental actions that affect private property
interests effect a taking if they (1)deny a n owner economically
viable use of her land, or (2) fail to substantially advance a
legitimate state i n t e r e ~ t . ~

3. This Comment is by no means the first piece of scholarly work that has
attempted to analyze the Supreme Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence and summarize the rules of law in this complex constitutional issue. See, e.g., John J.
Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983) (presenting a comprehensive model for takings
analysis). In 1988 a conference held at Dartmouth College presented the ideas of
several professors and practitioners in light of the four takings cases handed down
by the Supreme Court in 1987 (Nollan v. California Coastal Comrn'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U S . 304 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); and Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)). The works prepared for this
LAWREconference are reproduced in the December 1988 issue of the COLUMBIA
VIEW. Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM.L. REV.
1752 (1988);William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism
in Takings, 88 COLUM.L. REV. 1581 (1988); William W. Fisher 111, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1774
(1988); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is
Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM.L. REV. 1630 (1988); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM.L. REV. 1600 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman Takings];Frank
Michelman, A Reply to Susan Rose-Ackerman, 88 COLUM.L. REV. 1712 (1988);
Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM.L. REV. 1667 (1988); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLIJM.L. REV. 1697 (1988);
Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731
(1988); T. Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution. and Justice, 88 COLUM.L.
REV. 1714 (1988).
A compendium of current, informative and thought-provoking works on the Takings Clause can also be found in William C. Leigh & Bmce W. Burton, Predatory
Cibvernmental Zoning Practices and the Supreme Court's New Takings Clause Formulation: Timing, Value, and R.I.B.E., 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 876 app. B.
4. See infia part II1.B.
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I . Governmental actions that deny an owner economically
viable use of her land5

The first analysis applied by the Court examines governmental actions that affect the value or use of a person's private
property interest. Land-use regulations are the most common
type of governmental actions reviewed under this analysis. The
rule is that regulations that deny an owner economically viable
use of her land will be found t o violate the Takings Clause
whenever the regulations go "too far" in denying a landowner
In applying this rule, the Court
the benefit of her pr~perty.~
has recognized three categories of regulation: (a) regulations
that impose a permanent physical invasion, (b) regulations that
deny an owner all economically viable use of her land, and (c)
regulations that affect a property's value, but fall short of completely extinguishing the property's commercial value. When a
regulation fits into categories (a) or (b) the Court will find a
violation of the Takings Clause. In contrast, regulations that fit
into category (c) are seldom deemed t o violate the prohibition
against governmental takings.
The rule for each category of regulation can be summarized
as follows:
(a) Land-use regulations that compel the property owner to
suffer a permanent physical invasion, no matter how inconsequential, violate the Takings Clause.'
(b) Land-use regulations that deny the property owner all
economically beneficial or productive use of land violate the
. ~ fit into this category, a regulation must
Takings C l a u ~ e To
deprive the property owner of any residual value.g
(c) Land-use regulations that fall short of completely extinguishing a property's value probably do not violate the Takings
Clause.'' Nevertheless, the Court has suggested that a violation could be found by examining the economic impact of the
regulation, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the nature of
the governmental regulation."

See
See
See
See
Id.
10. See
11. Id.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

infra part III.B.l.
infra parts IIIA-B.1.
infra part III.B.l(a).
infra part III.B.l(b).
infra part III.B.l(c).
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2. Governmental actions that fail to substantially advance
legitimate state interestsl2
The modern Court has confined this second analysis to
examination of governmental development exactions.13 The
Court examines a development exaction to determine whether
the purpose behind the exaction substantially advances legitimate state interests.
In approaching development exactions the Court asks three
questions. First, does the state have the power to withhold
issuance of the development permit altogether? If not, then the
state cannot demand the exaction as a condition to issuance of
the permit. Second, does a n "essential news" exist between the
legitimate state interest and the permit requirement? The
exact "fit" necessary to meet the essential-nexus requirement
has not yet been clearly articulated. Third, is the degree of the
exaction "roughly proportional" to the projected impact of the
proposed development? To satisfy the "rough proportionality7'
requirement the government must have made an individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.

B. The Utah Supreme Court's Takings Analysis Under Article
I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution
In an inverse condemnation action against the State of
Utah, three elements must be satisfied before a private property owner can recover just compensation under article I, section
22 of the Utah Constitution.14 First, the property interest alleged to have been taken or damaged must be a recognized
interest in real property.15 Recognized property interests "include[], but [are] not limited to any land and improvements
subject to the substantive law of real property."16 Second, the

12. See infia part III.B.2.
13. "Development exactions are a form of land-use regulation in which a municipality requires a developer to give something to the community as a condition
to receiving permission to develop." Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, "'Take' My Beach,
Please!": Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Development Exactions, 69 B.U. L. REV. 823, 823 (1989) (citing
Donald L. C o ~ o r s& Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions: From
69, 70 (1987)).
Dedication ta Lidage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.BOBS.
14. See infia part N.B.
15. See infia part N.B.1.
16. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244
(Utah 1990) (citing 2 NICHOLSON EMINENTDOMAIN§ 5.45 (3d ed. 1990)).
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existence of a taking or damage must be confirmed by the
court.17 A "taking" is any state interference which reduces a
property's value or which substantially abridges the owner's
right to the enjoyment thereof. A "damaging" is any type of
state-initiated "permanent or recurring interference with property rights."18 Third, the alleged taking or damaging must
have been occasioned by the state for a legitimate public
use.lg If the alleged taking or damage is a result of negligence,
or not intended for the public benefit, it will not be compensable under article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution.

111. THE FEDERAL
TAKINGSANALYSIS:ECONOMIC
IMPACTAND
LEGITIMATE
STATEINTERESTS
"[Plrivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just omp pens at ion."^^ At first glance, interpretation of this
constitutional command appears to be straightforward. By its
terms, this clause requires the payment of "just compensation"
whenever government appropriates or acquires an individual's
private property for the benefit of the
Such a simple
characterization, however, belies the difficulties the Supreme
Court has faced in its struggle to articulate a logically consistent interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.
The root of the Court's struggle originates in its review of
two interrelated powers: the eminent domain power and the
police power. These two powers share an important similarity:
whenever either is exercised by a state or municipal government, it is always done for the benefit of the general public.
However, these two powers also have a distinct difference. By
definition, any exercise of the eminent domain power includes
the payment of just compensation for the private property taken.22 An exercise of the police power, on the other hand, sel17. See infia part N.B.2.
18. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah 1990).
19. See infia part N.B.3.
20. U.S. C o ~ s r amend.
.
V.
21. See, e.g., Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d
381, 384 (N.Y.) ("[Wlhen the State 'takes', that is appropriates, private property for
public use, just compensation must be paid. In contrast, when there is only regulation of the uses of private property, no compensation need be paid."), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 990 (1976).
22. Black's Law Dictionary defines eminent domain as
[tlhe power to take private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public character. . . However, the Constitution limits the power

.
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dom requires that the government compensate those directly
restricted by the reg~lation.'~This difference presents state
and municipal governments with a temptation that is difficult
to resist because much of what a government entity can accomplish affmatively through the eminent domain power can also
be accomplished negatively through the police power." In the
absence of a suitable restraint, governments could achieve
eminent domain goals at no cost through a simple exercise of
the police power. The modern federal takings analysis provides
such a restraint.
The early Supreme Court failed to recognize that regulatory exercises of the police power could amount to a de facto
exercise of the eminent domain power. In a long line of cases
which implicated Takings Clause
the Court routinely

to taking for a public purpose and prohibits the exercise of the power of
eminent domain without just compensation to the owners of the property
which is taken.
BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
470 (5th ed. 1979); see also US. C o ~ s r .amend. V.
23. See, cg., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) ("It is
an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition. If
this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police powers, the fact
that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional [or require compensation]." (citations omitted)); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (The police power is "one of the most essential powers of
government, one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence
precludes any limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily."); see also P e ~ s y l v a nia Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922):
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the
police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is,
in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without
making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health,
safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking [requiring compensation].
Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
24. Morosoff, supra note 13, explains that
A municipality could do this by simply passing a regulation that forbids
the property owner from asserting a traditionally recognized property
interest. This is exactly what P e ~ s y l v a n i aattempted to do in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. Rather than purchasing support rights from the
coal companies, the state passed the Kohler Act which prohibited the
companies from mining in such a way as to cause subsidence. This regulation effectively denied the companies all use of the support estate for
which the companies had expressly contracted.
Morosoff, supra note 13, at 832 n.76 (citation omitted, italics supplied).
25. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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sustained the state's use of its police power under a due process analysisz6 that ignored the dictates of the Takings
Cla~se.~'
Until Justice Holmes' landmark decision in Pennsyl~ Constitution's prohibition
vania Coal Co. v. M a h ~ n ? the
against taking went unrecognized as a valid check on the exercise of the police power. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes
acknowledged "the natural tendency of human nature" t o expand the operation of the police power "more and more until at
By requiring compensation
last private property disappears.77zg
whenever a "regulation goes too far? Pennsylvania Coal forever changed the Court's Takings Clause analysis.
The Supreme Court's modem application of the Takings
Clause, which has evolved since Holmes' time, can be distilled
into a two-pronged analysis that has its origins in early case
law. The modern Court either expressly applies the Takings
Clause and asks whether the regulation has gone "too far,"'
or it follows a limited due process analysis that asks whether
the regulation substantially advances a legitimate state intere ~ t A. brief
~ ~ review of the early developments in Supreme
Court takings jurisprudence enhances one's understanding of
the modern Court's two-pronged approach.

A. Early Federal Takings Cases:
The Roots of Modern Analysis
When first confronted with early Takings Clause challenges, the Supreme Court avoided applying the actual language of
the Takings Clause and instead examined the regulations using
a due process analysis. Resort to this analysis consistently

26. This due process analysis asked whether the regulation was a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power, primarily examining whether the regulation
protected a legitimate public purpose and whether the legislative means adequately
advanced the public purpose. Justice Brandeis' forceful dissent in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon exemplifies this approach in the context of land-use regulation.
260 U.S. 393, 417-18 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (The restriction upon the
use of this property can not, of course, be lawfully imposed, unless its purpose is
to protect the public. . . . Furthermore, a restriction, though imposed for a public
purpose, will not be lawful, unless the restriction is an appropriate means to the
public end.").
27. See infm part II1.A.
28. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
29. Id. at 415.
30. Id.
31. See infra part III.B.l.
32. See infra part III.B.2.
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favored government, upholding regulations that had a severe
economic impact on individual landowners.
For example, in Mugler v. Kansas,33 the State of Kansas
enacted a prohibition that denied the defendants essentially all
their properties' economically beneficial use.34 The Supreme
Court first upheld the regulations as a valid exercise of the
police power,35 and then rejected the idea that compensation
was required when a land-use regulation denies an owner all
beneficial use of her property.36 Later, in Hadacheck u.
S e b ~ s t i a n , ~the
' Court again invoked a due process analysis
and refused to grant relief to a property owner even though the
property's value was substantially diminished by a municipal
regulation. The Court reasoned that the regulation did not
require compensation because the municipality had grounded
its action in a rational exercise of the police power.38 The
plaintiff had purchased property worth approximately
$800,000.~~
Then the property's value was decreased to less
than $60,000 when the City of Los Angeles placed the land in a
33. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
34. Id. a t 654-57.The statute in question declared "that the manufacture and
sale of intoxicating liquors should be forever prohibited in [the] State." Id. at 655.
Defendants owned breweries that had been manufacturing alcoholic beverages since
before the statute was adopted, and the Court recognized that because of this
prohibition "the value of [defendants'] property will be very materially diminished."
Id. at 657.
35. Id. a t 660-62.The Court found that the statute was a legitimate exercise
of the state's police power to protect "the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety" and that it was "fairly adapted* to a legitimate public purpose. Id.
a t 662.
36. Id. at 664. The Court stated:
[Tlhe present case must be governed by principles that do not involve the
power of eminent domain, in the exercise of which property may not be
taken for public use without compensation. A prohibition simply upon the
use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be
injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in
any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for
the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the
control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to
dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any
one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests. . . . The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property
which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from
taking property for public use . . . .
Id. at 668-69.
37. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
38. Id. at 407-10.
39. Id. at 405.
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limited-use district.40Despite this enormous loss of value, the
Court denied relief:' reasoning that the regulation was a valid exercise of the police power and, as such, did not require
c~mpensation.~~
In these early cases the Court simply assumed that the
Takings Clause was not qualified to restrain an exercise of the
police power. With the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co.
u. M ~ h o n : ~however, the Court began to breathe life into the
Takings Clause. In Pennsylvania Coal, a coal company had sold
the plaintiffs a surface estate while expressly retaining the
right to mine the coal beneath the surface." Plaintiffs had
purchased the property with a n understanding that the underground coal mining might cause subsidence damage to their
surface estate.45 Then, Pennsylvania adopted legislation that
prohibited the mining of coal if such mining would cause surface collapse or damage:6 and plaintiffs sued to prevent the
coal company from mining below their property, alleging that
"whatever may have been the Coal Company's rights, they
were taken away by [the Pennsylvania law.]"47
For the first time, the Court gave heed to the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against taking. Justice Holmes recognized that the statute "destroy[ed] previously existing rights of
property," then queried "whether the police power [could] be
stretched so far."48 Believing. that a state's power to infringe
-

-

-

40. Id. at 404-05.
41. Id. at 408-09.
42. Id. at 409-10,413-14.The Court found no merit in the property owner's
claim. Concerning the municipality's exercise of the police power, the Court reasoned:
I t is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential powers of government, one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed,
seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not
exerted arbitrarily. . . . There must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in the way they must yield t o the good of the community .
Id. at 410.
43. 260 U.S.393 (1922).
44. Id. at 412.
45. Id. ("The deed conveys the surface, but in express terms reserves the
takes the premises
right to remove all the coal uhder the same, and the &tee
with the risk, and waives all claim for damages that may arise from mining out
the coal.").
46. Id. at 412-13.
47. Id. at 412.
48. Id. at 413.
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on property rights through regulation "must have its limits,"4g
Justice Holmes invoked a constitutional restraint on the exercise of the police power by citing the constitutional requirement
that government pay just compensation when diminution of
property value "reaches a certain magnitude."50He articulated
a simple test: "The general rule at least is, that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking."51This test is not a brightline rule. It was designed to engender a factual analysis which
would scrutinize all of the relevant factors before determining
whether a regulation had gone "too far."52
The modem two-pronged Takings Clause analysis has
grown from the decision in Pennsylvania Coal. The prong most
commonly relied upon is nothing more than an attempt to determine whether, as Justice Holmes expressed it, the regulation in question has gone too far." The numerous cases performing this factual examination have begotten multiple factors
that are more or less important depending upon the factual
scenario involved. Nevertheless, the economic diminution prong
49. Justice Holmes explained the problem as follows:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under a n implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the
implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process
clauses are gone.

Id.
50. Id. ("One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of
the diminution [in value]. When [the diminution] reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation t o sustain the act.").
51. Id. at 415.
52. "[Tlhe question depends upon the particular fads. The greatest weight is
given to the judgment of the legislature, but it always is open to interested parties
to contend that the legislatu,re has gone beyond its constitutional power." Id. a t
413. Subsequent courts have recognized the ad hoc nature of this approach. See
infi-a part III.B.l.
53. Professor Michelman has some provocative thoughts on this point. He
examined the current state of takings jurisprudence in 1987 and asked: "Wlhat
makes a regulatory restriction on the use or disposition of property become a taking for which just compensation is required by mandate of the United States Constitution"? Michelman Takings, supra note 3, at 1600-01. ARer noting that the
myriad of Takings Clause interpretations have failed to produce a simple, abstract
rule of law, he concludes that this lack of any definite rule of law is a healthy result of the judicial process. Id. a t 1625-29 (This result "is not law's antithesis but
a part of law's essence."). Cf. Kmiec, supra note 3, a t 1630-31 (disagreeing with
Professor Michelman's interpretation of the 1987 takings cases and attempting to
answer "the question the Court avoids: when does a regulatory taking occur?").
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has not outgrown the simple test envisioned by Justice Holmes:
the diminution in economic value gauges whether the exercise
of police power has gone too fars4 Economic diminution is the
most common analysis employed t o determine if a compensable
taking has occurred, and is free fkom the earlier Court's substantive due process examination of the government's exercise
of the police power. However, the early Court's substantive due
process analysis has not been entirely abandoned. The second
prong of modem Takings Clause analysis examines whether
the governmental action substantially advances legitimate
state interests. The application of this prong has been constrained to the narrow factual scenario of development exactions.

B. The Modern Court's Analysis
The modem Supreme Court's Takings Clause analysis
follows a two-pronged approach. In reviewing governmental
actions which trespass on individual property interests, the
Supreme Court will find a violation of the Takings Clause if
the government action (1)"denies an owner economically viable
use of his land," or (2) "does not substantially advance legitimate state interest^."^^ These two prongs are mutually exclusive; each is used to assess distinct factual situation^.^^ The
first is an outgrowth of Justice Holmes' fact-intensive general
rule which gauges whether the government's exercise of its police powers has gone too far by examining the property's diminution in economic value.57 The other path of analysis is a
remainder of the Court's substantive due process examination
of takings issues.58 This second path scrutinizes the

54. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
55. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citing Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 11.36 (1978), for the first prong
and Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), for the second prong).
Since &ins, the modern Court has frequently cited this passage as the general
rule for regulatory takings issues. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316
(1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Rituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedidis, 480 US. 470, 485 (1987).
56. These analyses are rooted in the early takings decisions of the Supreme
Court. For an overview of the influence these early decisions have had on modem
takings analysis, see supra part IIIA.
57. For a more detailed explanation of Justice Holmes' Pennsylvania Coal
dkcision, see supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
58. For a "genealogy of the two principal competing discourses of Supreme
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government's exercise of its police power more directly, striking
it down if it does not substantially advance a legitimate state
interest. The modern Court has only resorted to this analysis
when a municipality has denied a land-use permit for failure to
comply with a specific development e~action.~' .
This Comment will first examine the modern Court's attempt to delineate how far is "too far." This is the path of analysis that was begat by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal.60
Next, the Court's substantive due process analysis will be examined? This alternate path of analysis furthers Takings
Clause objectives by limiting a government's ability to exercise
its police power in the area of development exactions.

1. How far is too far? When regulation denies an owner economically viable use of the land
Most modern Takings Clause cases are analyzed under the
economic viability prong. When Justice Holmes stated that "if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking,"6z he
stated a test that is ill-suited to bright-line distinction^.^^ Indeed, he anticipated an analysis that would examine the facts
of a particular case,64especially the extent to which the government regulation diminishes a property's economic value,B5
in determining whether the government's land-use regulation
violates the Takings Clause.66 The modern Supreme Court
Court land use planning jurisprudence," see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal Discourse, Social Vision and the Supreme Court's Land Use Planning Law: Thc! Genealogy of the Lochnerian Recurmnce in First English Lutheran Church and
Nollan, 59 U. COLO.L. REV. 427, 428 (1988). According to Professor Williams, the
two competing discourses are: "[Tlhe discourse of aggressive judicial review of police power regulations grounded in the Lochner era social vision of property as a
fbndamental right, and the discourse of judicial deference grounded in the New
Deal social vision that rejected judicial intervention in the socioeconomic field." Id.
a t 428-29 (footnotes omitted); see also supra notes 25-27, 33-? and accompanying
text.

59. See, e.g., Dolan, 114 S. Ct. a t 2309; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
60. See supra part 1II.A.
61. See infra part III.B.2.
62. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US. 393, 415 (1922).
63. In Justice Holmes' words, this analysis is "a question of degree-and
t disposed of by general propositions." Id. at 416.
therefore c a ~ o be
64. Id. at 413 ("[Tlhe question depends upon the particular facts.").
65. Id. ("One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of
the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
act.").
66. Id. at 413-16.
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routinely relies upon Justice Holmes' reasoning as the foundation of its analysis under this prong.
The many cases that have relied on the economic diminution analysis have generated numerous factors that gauge the
extent of the property's diminution in value. In fact, the analysis is so case-sensitive that the Court has characterized it as an
"essentially ad hoe, factual inquirly].'*' Despite the numerous
factors that have been articulated over the years that might aid
the Court with its analysis, the Court will always find that a
land-use regulation violates the Takings Clause and requires
compensation in two narrow instances.68A land-use regulation violates the Takings Clause only when it either "compel[s]
the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his propert ~ ' ' ~or' when it "denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.'"' Regulations that only partially diminish a

67. Penn Central Tramp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(quoting Goldblatt v. City of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)); see also Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (acknowledging
that, "[olrdinarily, the Court must engage in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.").
The Lucas Court explained:
[Olur decision in Mahon offered little insight into when, and under what
circumstances, a given regulation would be seen as going "too far" for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. In 70-odd years of succeeding "regulatory takings" jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any "set formula"
for determining how far is too far, preferring to "engagle] in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). This ad hoc
approach has-not surprisingly-sometimes produced inconsistent results. Compare
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (finding that a state statute
which prohibited the mining of coal below inhabited land violated the requirements
of the Takings Clause), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470 (1987) (analyzing a factual scenario remarkably similar to that presented
in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court found that a state statute which prohibited the
mining of coal below inhabited land did not violate the requirements of the Takings Clause).
68. In a recent case the Court expressly acknowledged its practice of requiring compensation in only two limited situations. In Justice Scalia's words, the
Court has
described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in
support of the restraint. The first encompasses regulations that compel
the property owner to suffer a physical "invasion" of his property. . . .
The second situation in which [the Court has] found categorical treatment
appropriate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. a t 2893 (citations omitted).
69. Id.; see also Loretto, 458 U.S. a t 419; see infia part III.B.l(a).
70. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893; see infia part III.B.l(b).
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property's value, no matter how substantial the diminution,
have never been held to require c~mpensation.~'
When confronted with a regulation that denies an owner
economically viable use of the l i d , determine into which category the regulation best fits: (a) does the regulation impose an
actual physical invasion of property? (b) does the regulation
deny the owner all economically beneficial or productive use of
the land? or (c) does the regulation only partially diminish the
property's value? Constitutionality will depend on which category best contains the regulation in question. If the regulation
falls into category (a) or (6) it is unconstitutional and requires
compensation. But, if it falls into category (c) the regulation
has not risen to the level of a constitutional violation under the
Takings Clause.
(a) Regulations that impose an actual physical invasion of
property. Whenever government regulation compels a property
owner t o suffer actual physical invasion of property, "no matter
how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the
public purpose behind it,"72the Court has ' ' i n ~ a r i a b l ~ ~ f oa~ n d
taking."73
The modern case that best represents this rule is Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV C ~ r p . ~In* Loretto, the State
of New York enacted legislation "[tlo facilitate tenant access t o
[cable televi~ion]."~~
The law "provide[d] that a landlord
[could] not 'interfere with the installation of cable television
facilities upon his property.'"76 A landlord brought suit
against a cable television company that had installed cables on
the landlord's building, alleging that the company's installation
of cable under the provisions of the act was "a taking without
The Court ruled in favor of the landlord,
just ~om~ensation."'~

71. See infia part III.B.l(c).
72. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426). Cf. Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979) (holding that the imposition of
navigational servitude on a marina created and rendered navigable at private expense constituted a taking).
73. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427.
74. 458 US. 419 (1982).
75. Id. at 423. According to the New York Court of Appeals, this legislation
served "the legitimate public purpose of 'rapid development of . . . a means of
communication which has important educational and community aspects.'" Id. at
425 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 329
(N.Y. 1981) (reu'd, 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
76. Id. at 423 (quoting N.Y.EXEC.LAW § 828(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994)).
77. Id. at 424.
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concluding that a permanent physical occupation, no matter
how minor," constituted a taking of property for which just
compensation was due.7g The government's interest in this
regulation was of little weight i n the analysis. As the Loretto
Court explained, any "permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public
interests that [the regulation] may serve."80
(6) Regulations that deny the owner all economically beneficial or productive use of the land. As with regulations causing
a physical occupation, regulations that deprive an owner of all
economically beneficial use of a property are subject to a substantially predictable guideline. Whenever a land-use regulation is seen as effectively denying a landowner all economically
' Court has
beneficial or productive use of her p r ~ p e r t y , ~the
consistently found a taking and required om pens at ion.^^
78. This was, by all accounts, a very minor physical intrusion. The cable company "installed a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and of approximately 30 feet in length along the length of the building . . . and directional taps,
approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches on the front and rear of the roof."
Id. a t 422 (quoting Loretto, 423 N.E.2d a t 324).
79. Id. a t 426 ( W e conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized
by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve.
Our constitutional history confirms the rule, recent cases do not question it, and
the purposes of the Takings Clause compel its retention.").
80. Id.
81. The Court has described these occurrences as "relatively rare situations"
and as "extraordinary circumstance[s]." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992). If the Court determines that the regulation does not
effect a complete denial of all eco~omicallybeneficial or productive use, then the
Court will apply a different analysis. For the analysis applicable to situations in
which the regulation leaves the property with some value, see infia part III.B.l.(c).
82. Notice that the Court has the final say in determining whether a regulation has in fact denied a landowner of all economically beneficial or productive
use-an inherently qualitative determination. Many landowners have sought relief
under the Takings Clause only to be denied because, in the Court's view, the regulation did not completely extinguish a hndamental attribute of ownership, leaving
the landowner something more than nothing. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also
infra part 1II.B.l(c).
I n Lucas, the Supreme Court acknowledged this problem of subjectivity, recognized that it had sometimes led to inconsistent results, but declined to resolve the
issue on the facts of that case. The Court explained:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically
feasible use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not
make clear the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be
measured. . . . Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty regarding the composition
of the denominator in our "deprivation" fraction has produced inconsistent
[results]. The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's
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The modern case that best represents this proposition is
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Cornmissi~n.'~In Lucas, a
developer had purchased two shorefront lots on a barrier island
with plans to construct single-family houses on the 10ts.'~The
properties were not subject to the state's coastal regulations at
the time of p~rchase.'~
However, two years later the state legislature enacted the Beachfront Management
which
barred the developer from erecting any permanent habitable
structures on the lots.'? The developer "promptly filed suit . . .
contending that the . . . Act's construction bar effected a taking
of his property without just compensation.'"' The trial court
found that the Act "decreed a permanent ban on construction
insofar as [the developer's] lots were concerned, and that this
prohibition 'deprive[d the developer] of any reasonable economic use of the lots, . . . and renderred] them ~alueless.""~The
trial court then "concluded that [the developer's] properties had
been 'taken' by operation of the Act, and it ordered [the state]
to pay 'just cornpensati~n."~~
The state supreme court reversed, resorting to an analysis reminiscent of the early Court's
takings decision^.^^ Deferring to the state legislature's "uncontested findings" that new construction threatened the public
shoreline res0urces,9~the state supreme court ruled that when
a regulation is designed to "prevent serious public harmY3

reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property-i.e.,
whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal
recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with respect
to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of)
value. In any event, we avoid this difficulty in the present case . . . .
112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7 (citations omitted).
83. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
84. Id. at 2889. The developer paid $975,000 for the lots. Id.
85. Id. at 2890.
86. S.C. CODEANN. § 48-39-250 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
87. Lucas, 122 S. Ct. a t 2889.
88. Id. at 2890. The petitioner "did not take issue with the validity of the
Act as a lawful exercise of [the state's] police power, but contended that the Act's
complete extinguishment of his property's value entitled him to compensation regardless of whether the legislature had acted in furtherance of legitimate police
power objectives." Id.
89. Id. at 2890 (citations omitted).
90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. See supra part IIIA.
92. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C. 1991).
93. Id. a t 899 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
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"no compensation is owing under the Takings Clause regardless
of the regulation's effect on the property's value."94
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
recognizing the general rule that "where regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land,"95compensation is required "without case-specific inquiry into the public
interest advanced in support of the r e ~ t r a i n t . "The
~ ~ Court
cited numerous cases to support this general rule:'
but candidly recognized that it has "never set forth the justification for
this rule."g8 Then, after discussing several possible justificat i o n ~ the
, ~ ~Court bluntly concluded that "there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to
leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.''' O0
The Court then engaged in a lengthy attempt to clarify its
holding (and this general rule) in light of its numerous prior
opinion^'^' which suggest "that 'harmful or noxious uses' of
property may be proscribed by government regulation without
the requirement of compen~ation."'~~

94. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890 (quoting Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899).
95. Id. at 2893.
96. Id. (citations omitted).
97. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
98. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
99. The Court begins by stating that "perhapsn the rule exists because "total
deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent
of a physical appropriation." Id. (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U S . 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). The Court then advances a second justification: "regulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use . . . carry with them a heightened
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under
the guise of mitigating serious public harm." Id. a t 2894-95. The Court continued,
explaining that "[tlhe many statutes on the books . . . that provide for the use of
eminent domain to impose servitudes on private scenic lands preventing developmental uses . . . suggest the practical equivalence in this setting of negative regulation and appropriation." Id. a t 2895.
100. Id. a t 2895 (emphasis in original).
101. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). For a discussion of the trend established in these
cases, see supra part 111.
102. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897. The Court characterizes its "'harmful or nox-
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Although this general rule might seem impenetrable,
Lucas recognized one potentially significant exception: "Where
the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of
the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were
not part of his [or her] title to begin with."lo3 In other words,
a state can avoid this general rule requiring compensation by
demonstrating that the property owner's bundle of rights did
not include the property interest impaired by the regulation. To
determine which rights are included in the proverbial "bundle"
and which are not, the Court defers to the '%ackground principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already. . .
upon land ownership" when property is p ~ r c h a s e d . 'In
~ ~other
words, government can still regulate away all economically
beneficial use of land if it can show that "it was possible to
prohibit this use under the state's existing property law."lo5

ious use' analysis" as an "early attempt to describe in theoretical terms why government may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate." Id. a t 2897. The Court substantially impairs the vitality of its "harmful or noxious use" logic as a means for
identifying regulatory takings that require compensation, id. a t 2898-99, by boxing
it into a substantive due process analysis. The Court states: "'Harmful or noxious
use' analysis was . . . simply the progenitor of our more contemporary statements
that land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advance[sl legitimate state interests.'" Id. a t 2897 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. a t 834). See infra
part III.B.2. In other words, "'prevention of harmful use' was merely [the Court's]
early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without
compensation) any regulatory diminution in value." 112 S. Ct. a t 2898-99. And
since what constitutes a harmful use may be impossible to discern, "noxious-use
logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory 'takings9-which require
compensation-from regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation. A
fortiori the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis
for departing from [the] categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated." Id. at 2899.
103. Id. at 2898.
104. Id. a t 2900-02.
105. The Court's precise approach to this exception is expressed as follows:
Where "permanent physical occupation" of land is concerned, we have refused to allow the government to decree it anew (without compensation),
no matter how weighty the asserted "public interests" involved-though
we assuredly would permit the government to assert a permanent easement that was a preexisting limitation upon the landowner's title. We believe similar treatment must be accorded confiscatory regulations, i.e.,
regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land: Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the rixtridions that background of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon
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(c) Regulations that fall short of completely extinguishing
a property's value. If the regulation falls short of completely extinguishing a property's value, the landowner's chances of recoveri~gcompensation are slim. Only regulations that amount
to a permanent physical invasion of property or deprive the
owner of all economic value have been found t o require compensation. Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has regularly
threatened t o find a taking in this category, but it has never
required compensation unless the regulation deprived the property of all economic value.'06 Of course, the Court may one
day sharpen the teeth of this less-than-total-deprivation analysis.'" Therefore, the factors that the Court has examined and
applied in analyzing regulations that deprive the landowner of
less than all beneficial use may profitably be reviewed. Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City'" identifies
these factors.
In Penn Central, the City of New York enacted an ordinance designed t o "protect [its] historic landmarks and neighborhoods from precipitate decisions to destroy or fundamentally
alter their chara~ter."'~~
The city believed that its "'standing. . . as a world-wide tourist center and world capital of
business, culture and government' would be threatened" without this ordinance.'lo ''The primary responsibility for admin-

land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other
words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been
achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected
persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under
its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
Id. at 2900 (citations omitted).
106. For an overview of the Court's approach to regulations that deny all economically viable use of land, see supra part III.B.l(b).
107. In Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an Old
Constitutional Tale, 64 NOTREDAME L. REV. 1 (1989), Professor Wilkins suggests
that the Court could give the Takings Clause an appropriate bite by consistently
applying the three factors enumerated in P ~ MCentral Transportation Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See infia notes 109-128 and accompanying text.
108. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
109. Id. at 109.
110. Id.
The city believed that comprehensive measures to safeguard desirable features of the existing urban fabric would benefit its citizens in a variety of
ways: e.g., fostering "civic pride in the beauty and noble accomplishments
of the past"; protecting and enhancing "the city's attractions to tourists
and visitors"; "support[ing] and stimul[ating] business and industry";
"strengthen[ing] the economy of the city"; and promoting "the use of his-
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istering the ordinance [was] vested in the Landmarks Preservation Commission.""' Acting pursuant to its authority under
the ordinance, "the Commission designated [Grand Central]
Terminal a 'landmark"' property.ll2 Under the provisions of
the ordinance, the owners of a landmark property were required to obtain permission from the commission before altering the exterior of the property.ll3 The owner of Grand Central Terminal, a corporation that opposed the landmark designation but "did not seek judicial review of the final designation
decision" as authorized under the landmarks law, entered a
lease agreement whereby the lessee would "construct a multistory office building [in the space] above the Terminal."114
The owner and lessee then sought the Commission's approval
for the contemplated construction as required under the landmark ordinance.ll5 Two different plans for construction of the
proposed office building above the terminal, both of which satisfied the applicable zoning ordinances, were deemed unacceptable by the Cornmi~sion."~The owner of the terminal and
the lessee brought suit claiming that application of New York

toric districts, landmarks, interior landmarks and scenic landmarks for
the education, pleasure and welfare of the people of the city."
Id. (alterations in original).
111. Id. at 110.
112. Id. at 115. Properties were to be given "landmark" status if the Commission determined that the properties had "a special character or special historical or
aesthetic interest or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation." Id. a t 110.
113. Specifically, the law imposed two restrictions on the owner of landmark
property:
First, the law imposes a duty upon the owner to keep the exterior features of the building "in good repair" to assure that the law's objectives
not be defeated by the landmark's falling into a state of irremediable
disrepair. Second, the Commission must approve in advance any proposal
to alter the exterior architectural features of the landmark or to construct
any exterior improvement on the landmark site, thus ensuring that decisions concerning construction on the landmark site are made with due
consideration of both the public interest in the maintenance of the structure and the landowner's interest in use of the property.
Id. at 112.
114. Id. at 116.
115. Id.
116. Id. a t 116-18. One of the plans was rejected because it involved "tearing
down a portion of the Terminal [ i d ] stripping off" some of its features. Id. a t
116-17. The other plan, which involved cantilevering a 55-story building above the
Terminal's facade and resting it on the Terminal's roof, was rejected because such
a massive building would destroy one view of the site and would be aesthetically
inconsistent with the Terminal's architectural style. Id. a t 116-18.
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City's landmarks law had "taken" private property without just
compensation.'"
The Supreme Court ruled that designating the Grand Central Terminal as a landmark property and subjecting it to New
York City's landmarks law did not amount t o a taking.'18 To
reach this holding, the Court "review[ed] the factors that have
shaped the jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment injunction
[against takings without just compensation]""g and articulated three fa~tors''~for determining when a regulation
amounts to a taking:''' (1)"[tlhe economic impact of the regulation on the claimant," (2) "the extent t o which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,"
and (3) "the character of the governmental action."lp After
articulating these factors, the Court assessed the appellant's
takings claim and refused to find a taking for several reas o n ~ . 'First,
~
the law did not interfere with the building's
present uses, but allowed the owner to continue using it as had
been done in the past. In the Court's judgment, this permitted
the owner to "obtain a 'reasonable return' on its investment?
Second, the law did not necessarily prohibit occupancy of any of the air space above the landmark building,
since it was possible that construction in the air space might be
allowed in the future? Third, the law did not deny all use of
the owner's pre-existing air right above the landmark building,
since under a transferable rights program, the owner could
117. Id. at 119.
118. Id. at 138.
119. Id. at 123.
120. The Court characterized these factors as having "particular significance."
Id. at 124. For a comprehensive overview and analysis of these three factors, see
Craig A. Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme
Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 339-51 (1988).
121. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. a t 124. Before articulating these factors, the Court noted:
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable dificulty. . . .
Indeed, [the Court has] frequently observed that whether a particular
restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for
any losses proximately caused by it depends largely "upon the particular
circumstances [in that] case."
Id. at 123-24 (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155,
168 (1958)).
122. Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 128-138.
124. Id. at 136.
125. Id. at 136-37.
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transfer the development rights it was foreclosed from using at
Grand Central Terminal to its other neighboring properties. 12'
The factors presented in Penn Central for determining
whether a regulation that only partially diminishes the
property's value amounts to a taking rarely lead to the conclusion that a taking has occurred.127As a practical matter, a
regulation must deprive an owner of all economically beneficial
use of the land or a violation of the Takings Clause will not be
found. '21
2. The police power limit: governmental development exactions
that do not substantially advance legitimate state interests
In recent years, the Supreme Court has also examined a
narrow species of Takings Clause challenges using a substantive due process analysis. Instead of asking whether the
government's action has gone too far, the Court has examined
whether the governmental action substantially advances the
state interest.12' This substantive due process analysis is applied to the narrow circumstance in which a state or municipal
government has conditioned the grant of a land-use permit
upon the dedication of a specific property interest. Such a condition is called a "development exaction" because the government is exacting something i n return for allowing development? In two recent development exactions cases, Nollan v.

126. Id. at 137.
127. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987).
128. See supra part III.B.l(b).
129. The Court's return to a substantive due process analysis has been sharply
criticized as an unnecessary revival of a discredited approach to judicial analysis.
See, e.g., Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 S.U. L.
REV.627 (1988); David A. Myers, Some Observations on the Analysis of Regulatory
Takings in the Rehnquist Court, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 527 (1989); Wilkins, supra
note 107, at 3-4 ("The wisdom of testing legislative or administrative action against
a rigorous 'meandends' standard, however, is questionable. Such an approach
proved unmanageable and unwise in the heyday of 'substantive due process,' and
there is little reason to think the methodology will prove more workable--or justifiable-in the context of the takings clause.").
130. See, e.g., Morosoff, supra note 13, a t 823 ("Development exactions are a
form of land-use regulation in which a municipality requires a developer to give
something t o the community as a condition to receiving permission to develop.")
(citing Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, m e Expanding Circle of Exactions:
From Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.PROBS.
69, 70 (1987)).
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California Coastal Commi~sion'~'and Dolan v. City of
Tigard,ls2 the Court has used this substantive due process
approach. I n both cases, the landowner prevailed; the
governments' attempts to exact a permanent public easement
by making the granting of the easement a condition for obtaining a development permit violated the Takings C l a u ~ e . ' ~
In Nollan, the owners of a beachfront lot sought to tear
down an old bungalow on the premises and replace it with a
larger house.134As required by state law, the owners applied
to the California Coastal Commission for a building permit.ls5
The Commission granted the building permit on condition that
the owners give "the public a n easement to pass across [the]
portion of their property" which lay between the water and the
house.'" The owners petitioned for a writ of administrative
mandamus and obtained a permit over the Commission's denial.13' The Commission appealed.13' On appeal, the Supreme
Court held the Commission's exaction violated the Takings
Clause.'" A similar scenario occurred in Dolan. In that case,
the owner of a local business wished to expand her store and
pave her parking lot.140 The owner applied for the requisite
building permit.l4' The City Planning Commission conditioned approval of the owner's construction upon the dedication
of a portion of her property for a public greenway and for a

131. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
132. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
133. For a n examination of how the Takings Clause can be interpreted to protect property owners from the various "predatory municipal zoning practices," see
Leigh & Burton, supra note 3, at 828. But cf. Vicki Been, *ExitMa s a Constraint
on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91
COLIJM.L. REV.473, 543-45 (1991) (arguing that the case for imposing legal constraints-particularly
as a matter of constitutional law-is weak because market
forces can adequately constrain the conduct of municipalities).
Professor Sterk has proposed several reasons why Professor Been's campaign to
relax constitutional restraints in favor of market forces and economic restraints is
misguided. Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on
Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND.L. REV.831 (1992) (asserting that market forces are
inadequate to eliminate the potential for municipal abuse of the exaction process).
134. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-28.
135. Id. a t 828.
136. Id.
137. Id. a t 828-29.
138. Id. a t 829.
139. Id. a t 841-42.
140. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2311 (1994).
141. Id. a t 2313.
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public bicycle path.'42 Expanding upon the analysis established in Nollan, the Supreme Court held that the city's dedication requirement constituted an uncompensated taking of
property. lu
An understanding of the Court's logic is necessary in order
to fully appreciate the Court's analysis in these cases. That
analysis is based on the assumption that the government has
the power to withhold issuance of the permit altogether?
The Court reasoned in Nollan as follows: "If a prohibition designed to accomplish [the city's] purpose would be a legitimate
exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it would be
strange to conclude that providing the owner a n alternative to
that prohibition which accomplishes the same purpose is
not."145 Furthermore, "a permit condition that serves the
same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the
permit should not be found to be a taking."'46 Therefore, a
taking should be found only if the condition's purpose differs
from the legitimate police-power purpose for withholding the
permit.
In making this determination, the Court follows a two-step
analysis. It first "determine[s] whether the 'essential nexus'
exists between the 'legitimate state interest' and the permit
condition exacted by the city.""' This primary inquiry examines whether the state's articulated purpose for demanding
fulfillment of the condition adequately relates to the actual
demands of the condition. This is a necessary first inquiry
because, "if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly
fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the
prohibition," then "[tlhe evident constitutional propriety [arising from the state's power to withhold the permit altogether]
disappears."'" Nollan provides a n illustration. In that case,
the State Commission asserted an interest in (1) "protecting
the public's ability to see the beach," (2) "assisting the public in

142. Id. at 2314.
143. Id. at 2316-22.
144. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 836.
147. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837). For a detailed
examination of the Nollan Court's nexus requirement, see William A. Falik & Anna
C. Shimko, The "Takings Nexus*-The Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in
Land-UsePlanning: A View born California, 39 HASTINGS
LJ. 359 (1988).
148. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
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overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach treated by a developed shorefront," and (3) "preventing congestion
on the public beaches."14gThe Court agreed, without deciding,
that these are valid public purposes for which the Commission
"unquestionably would be able to deny the [owners] their permit outright if their new house . . . would substantially impede
these purposes."150Despite the apparent validity of these purposes, however, the Court recognized that "unless the permit
condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of
land use but 'an out-and-out plan of e~tortion.""~~
Then,
without explaining "how close a 'fit' between the condition and
t h e burden is required,"ls2 the Court held t h a t the
Commission's "imposition of the permit condition cannot be
treated as a n exercise of its land-use power for any of [its asserted public]
The Court in Nollan thus did not

149. Id. a t 835.
150. Id. at 835-36. After noting that the Court's "cases have not elaborated on
the standards for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest,'" but
that "[tlhey have made clear that a broad range of governmental purposes and
regulations satisfies these requirements," id. at 834-35, the Court addressed this
initial question as follows:
The Commission argues that among these permissible purposes are protecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the "psychological barrier" to using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public beaches. We
assume, without deciding, that this is so-in which case the Commission
unquestionably would be able to deny the [owners] their permit outright
if their new house . . . would substantially impede these purposes . . . .
Id. a t 835-36. Citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), the Court noted that a taking could still be found if the "denial would
interfere so drastically with the [owner's] use of their property as to constitute a
taking." Id. at 836. See supra part III.B.l(c).
151. Nollan, 483 U.S.at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d
12, 14-15 (N.H.1981)) (other citation omitted).
152. Id. at 838.
153. Id. at 839. The Nollan Court explained why it felt that the condition in
that case did not adequately relate to the state's police power purposes.
I t is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the prospective property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new
house. I t is also impossible to understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using the public beaches, or how it helps to remedy any
additional congestion on them caused by construction of the prospective
new house.
Id. at 838-42.
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find the requisite nexus between the condition's demands and
the state's purpose in making those demands.154
When the Court does find the requisite nexus, the Court
will proceed to the next inquiry: "whether the degree of the
exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bear the
required relationship to the projected impact of [the] proposed
de~eloprnent."'~~
In Nollan, the Court never delineated what
constituted the "required relationship" because the development exaction was invalidated under the fvst inquiry.156The
required relationship was, however, articulated in Dolan. In
that case, the Court found that the essential nexus exists between preventing flooding and congestion and requiring partial
dedication of the owner's property for a public greenway and
bicycle path.15? Turning to the second part of the analysis,
the Court asked "whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions [bore] the required relationship to the projected impact of [the owner's] proposed development."15' The Court approved of the intermediate position
taken by many states that requires a "'reasonable relationship'
between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed
de~eloprnent."'~~
However, the Court declined t o adopt this
reasonable relationship test "partly because the term 'reasonable relationship' seems confusingly similar to the term 'rational basis' which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."160Instead, the Court adopted a test of "rough proportionality."16' Under the rough proportionality test, "[nlo precise mathematical calculation is required, but the [government]
must make some sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed de~elopment."'~~

154. See id. at 838-39.
155. Dolan v. City ofi Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2318 (1994) (citing Nollan, 483
U.S. a t 834).
156. Id. at 2317; see also Nollan, 483 U.S. a t 838-39.
157. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. a t 2318.
158. Id. (citing Nollan, 483 US. a t 834).
159. Id. at 2319.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2319-20.
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IV. THE UTAHANALYSISUNDERARTICLEI, SECTION22 OF
THE UTAHCONSTITUTION
A state's power of eminent domain is "[tlhe power to take private property for public use."'" In exercising this power,
however, the state is required, by express constitutional command, to pay "just compensation" for any private property it
takes or damages for public use.'" The process of exercising
the eminent domain power is commonly referred to as "condemnation."'" In Utah, legislation has been adopted to guide the
state's exercise of its eminent domain power i n condemnation
proceeding^.'^^ Utah's eminent domain statute establishes
specific public uses for which the eminent domain power may
be exercised.lB7In addition, it identifies the types of private
property that may be taken,'68 sets the conditions precedent
to c ~ n d e m n a t i o n , ' ~indicates
~
how to assess compensation,'" and generally outlines the details of condemnation
pro~eedings.'~'
If, however, the state takes private property without initiating a condemnation proceeding, the private property owner
may initiate a n "inverse condemnation" action against the
state.'72 The Utah Supreme Court's analysis of inverse condemnation claims is grounded in the requirements of article I,
section 22 of the Utah Constitution. To understand the Utah
court's application of article I, section 22, it is necessary to first
163. BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
470 (5th ed. 1979).
164. The Federal Constitution states: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.amend. V. The Utah Constitution parallels the Federal Constitution in substantial part: "l?rivate property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." UTAH
CONST.art. I, $ 22. Notice that the Utah Constitution expressly prohibits "taking"
or "damaging" private property for public use without just compensation, while the
Federal Constitution only expressly prohibits a "taking."
470 (5th ed. 1979). In a condemnation action,
165. BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY
the state initiates a legal proceeding to determine the value of the property. See
UTAH CODEANN. $$ 78-34-1to 78-34-20(1992).
166. See UTAHCODEANN. $$ 78-34-1to 78-34-20(1992).
167. Id. $ 78-34-1.
168. Id. $ 78-34-3.
169. Id. $ 78-34-4.
170. Id. 9 78-34-10.
171. Id. $8 78-34-6to 78-34-16.
172. Inverse condemnation is "[a] cause of action against a government agency
t o recover the value of property taken by the agency, though no formal exercise of
the power of eminent domain has been completed." BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY740
(5th ed. 1979) (citation omitted).
'
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understand how, historically, confusion surrounding the doctrine of sovereign immunity impeded the full application of
Utah's takings clause.

A. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity and the Development
of Utah's Takings Analysis
In the earliest days of Utah's history, even before adoption
of the Utah Constitution, the territorial court was sympathetic
to individuals whose private property had been injured by the
Ratification of the Utah Constitution in 1896
raised this sentiment to the level of a constitutionally guaranteed protection. Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution
provides, quite simply, that "[plrivate property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensat i ~ n . " 'By
~ ~its express terms, the Utah clause would seem to
provide more explicit protection than that provided by the Taksince the Utah clause
ings Clause of the Fifth Arnend~nent,'~~
requires compensation for both a "taking" and a "damaging" of
private property. Ironically, rather than providing heightened
protection, this distinction between taking and damaging retarded the development of takings protection in Utah.
When the Utah Supreme Court began to distinguish claims
that asserted a taking of property from those that asserted only
a damaging, a property owner's remedies against the state
under article I, section 22 for a taking or damaging of private
property began to diminish.'" Eventually, in Holt v. Utah
State Road Commi~sion,'~~
the court reached the conclusion
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a private property owner from suing the state for a damaging of property.'?' The Holt court strictly construed the Utah Governmen173. See, e.g., Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 33 P. 229 (Utah
1893) (upholding an injunction that stopped construction of a third set of trolley
tracks and electric poles along Dooly Block's lots, reasoning that the construction
would seriously reduce the value of the property and was not necessary to provide
public transportation).
174. UTAHCONST.art. I, 8 22.
175. The Takings Clause of the FiRh Amendment provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. For an examination of the Supreme Court's multifarious application of
this clause, see s u p m parts I1 & 111.
176. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Rd. Comm'n v. District Court, 78 P.2d 502,
512-25 (Utah 1938) (Wolfe, J., dissenting) (arguing that damages and takings
claims require separate procedural remedies).
177. 511 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973).
178. Id. a t 1288; see also Anderson Inv. Corp. v. State, 503 P.2d 144, 147
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tal Immunity Act'?' "to preserve sovereign immunity," and
concluded that "the State waived immunity only where clearly
expres~ed."'~~
Since the state had not clearly waived its immunity from suit in takings cases, the court concluded that
even claims for just compensation based on article I, section 22
of the Utah Constitution were pre~luded.'~'Until 1990, a n
individual property owner's ability to pursue a n inverse condemnation claim was severely limited by this sovereign immunity rationale.lg2
Colman v. Utah State Land Boardlm dissolved the governmental immunity barrier to property damages claims. I n
this case, a landowner brought an inverse condemnation action
alleging that the state's "destruction of his canal constitute[d] a
taking of his property without just compensation in violation of
article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution."'* The state
responded that it was immune from this inverse condemnation
claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act?' After
reviewing the history of article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution, and noting that "the overwhelming majority of states
with similar constitutional provisions hold them to be self-executing,"lg6 the court overruled thirty years of precedent and
"reaffirm[ed] that article I, section 22 is self exe~uting."'~~
In
so holding, the court recognized that property owners who
(Utah 1972) (concluding that sovereign immunity precludes a landowner's suit for
injunctive relief against state commissioners as long as the commissioners have
acted within the scope of their authority); Hampton v. State ex rel. Road Comrn'n,
445 P.2d 708, 709 (Utah 1968) (disallowing a damage claim to property on the
grounds of sovereign immunity); Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 241 P.2d 907, 908-09 (Utah
1952) (concluding that in the absence of state consent, sovereign immunity barred
actions by private property owners against the state or its employees for injury to
property). But see Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1325-26 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) (reasoning that substantial impairment of a right appurtenant to
property ownership which causes substantial devaluation, though not sufficient to
amount to a physical taking, warrants compensation).
179. UTAH CODEANN. $8 63-30-1 to 63-30-34 (1953) (the complete act is codified at UTAHCODEANN. $8 63-30-1 to 63-30-38 (1993)).
180. Justin T. Toth, Note, Colrnan v. Utah State Land Board: Searching for a
Balanced Approach to "Takings" Under the Utah Constitution, 1991 UTAH L. REV.
505, 511; see also Holt, 511 P.2d at 1288.
181. Holt, 511 P.2d a t 1287-88.
182. For a discussion of the case law that led to the Colman decision and an
examination of the analysis in that case, see Toth, supra note 180, a t 505.
183. 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
184. Id. at 630.
185. Id.
186. For a list of these states, see id. at 632 n.2.
187. Id. at 630.
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suffer a taking or damaging of property have a constitutional
right to sue the state to recover just compensation. Accordingly,
the state's consent to suit through waiver of sovereign immunity is no longer a prerequisite to recovering just compensation
under article I, section 22 in Utah?

B. The Utah Supreme Court's Modern Takings Analysis
I n the Utah Supreme Court's most recent appli~ation''~
of article I, section 22, the court articulated three elements of
a n inverse condemnation claim: Tor the purposes of [this]
constitutional provision, a n inverse condemnation action requires (1)property, (2) a taking or damages, and (3) a public
use."1g0 This methodical approach logically incorporates prior
precedent into a n efficient three-element analysis. The simplicity of these three elements can mislead one into believing
that the analysis is complete. As Justice Zimmerman observed,
however, "the precise limits of a taking or damaging have yet
to be carefully or consistently spelled out by this co~rt."'~'Indeed, all five justices agree that "a detailed picture of what
constitutes a taking or damaging has not [yet] been painted by
this court."192Therefore, while these three elements provide a

188. The court frankly conceded that its old precedent had failed to give article I, section 22 its proper place in constitutional government.
The history of these cases shows that for a time the Court's concentration
on the doctrine of sovereign immunity caused it to neglect this constitutional provision, which was designed to protect individual rights. This
elevation of legislation and common law principles over a clear constitutional limitation strikes at the heart of constitutional government. The
people of Utah established the Utah Constitution as a limitation on the
power of government. It can hardly be maintained that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, alone among all doctrines, is outside of the limitations the people established.
Id. a t 634-35.
189. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah
1990).
190. Id. at 1243-44.
191. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 637 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (citing Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988)). Reversing a long line of precedent, Colman made a significant contribution t o the Ui.ah takings analysis by holding that article I, section 22 of the
Utah Constitution was self-executing. Id. at 630; se2 supra notes 183-188 and accompanying text. Justice Zimmerman remarked, however, that "[tlhere will be time
enough for [the court] t o carefully consider [the precise limits of a taking or damaging] i n future cases." Colman, 795 P.2d a t 637.
192. City of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697, 701 (Utah 1990)
(citing Colman, 795 P.2d a t 625-31).
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concise analysis, the court has recognized that there remains
ample room to further develop its application of article I, section 22.

1. Nature of the property
The first element of an inverse condemnation analysis in
Utah's courts examines whether the plaintiff possesses a property interest protected by article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution. "A claimant must possess some protectible interest in
property before that interest [sic] is entitled to recover under
[article I, section 22]."193"Property" is a term that can be construed very broadly. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized
that the term "'property' includes but is not limited to land and
improvements subject to the substantive law of real property."lS4 Under this definition, any real estate, structure,lg5 or
interest in landlg6would be recognized as a legitimate property interest protected from taking or damaging by article I,
section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
Although the term "property" is interpreted very broadly, it
does have its limits. For example, in Walker v. Brigham
citylg7 the plaintiff sued Brigham City, contending that the
193. Colrnan, 795 P.2d at 625.
194. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountfil City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244
(citing 2 NICHOLAS'THE LAWOF EMINENTDOMAIN,5 5.45 (3d ed. 1990)).
195. See, eg., Farmers, 803 P.2d a t 1244 (recognizing the structural damage to
a commercial mall caused by adjacent construction as a "property interest protected
by article I, section 22"); Lund v. Salt Lake County, 200 P. 510, 512 (Utah 1921)
(considering an inverse condemnation claim for the contamination of a pond and
the destruction of fish, the court stated that "[tlhe kinds of property subject to the
[eminent domain right are] practically unlimited"); O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. &
S.L.R. Co., 114 P. 127 (Utah 1911) (finding a house damaged by the vibrations,
smoke and cinders of a nearby railroad within the definition of protected property
under article I, section 22).
196. "An easement is an interest in land, and it is taken in the constitutional
sense when the land over which it is exercised is taken; but if it is only destroyed
and ended, a destruction for public purposes may also be an appropriation for the
same purpose." Cohuzn, 795 P.2d at 625 (quoting 2 NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN5 5.14 at 5-186 (3d ed. 1989)). Both express and implied easements
have been recognized a s property interests protected by article I, section 22 of the
Utah Constitution. See, e.g., d. at 625 (recognizing an express easement in an
underwater canal as protected property); Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526
P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974) (recognizing an implied easement); Hampton v. State
ex rel. Road Comm'n, 445 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1968) (recognizing a property
owner's ability to access an abutting highway as protected property); Whiterocks
Irrigation Co. v. Mooseman, 141 P. 459, 460 (Utah 1914) (recognizing an express
easement).
197. 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993).
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city's "excessive" overcharging for electric utility service was a n
unconstitutional taking.''' Invoking the property interest element, the court quickly noted that the plaintifrs contention
failed to "demonstrate that he has 'some protectible interest i n
property.""" For purposes of article I, section 22, the court
concluded that there is no "property interest in the rate
charged for utility service."200

2. Existence of a taking or damage
Once the court determines that the plaintiff possesses a
protectible property interest, the court examines whether that
interest has been taken or damaged. The court defines a taking as "any substantial interference with private property
which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the
owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial
degree abridged or destr~yed."~~'
This definition accommodates the natural idea that a taking has occurred whenever
state actions lessen a property's value or impair its use.In characterizing the damage requirement of article I, section 22, the
court distinguishes between physical damage that is of a onetime natureZo2and damage that is recurrent in nature. Onetime damage causes monetary loss but does not permanently
lower the property's value (once it has been repaired), while
recurrent damage, because of its recurrence, permanently diminishes the property's value. "[Dlamages protectible under
article I, section 22 must be physical and permanent, continuous, or recurring."203Damage of a one-time nature causes a
pecuniary harm, but such one-time damage does not permanently diminish the property's value. Of course, damage that

198. Id. a t 351.
199. Id. (quoting Colman, 795 P.2d a t 625).
200. Id. n.20 (citations omitted).
201. Colman, 795 P.2d at 626 (quoting State ex rel. State Rd. Comm'n v. District Court, 78 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1937)); see Hampton, 445 P.2d at 711-12.
202. In Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d
459, 465 (Utah 1989), a business owner's inverse condemnation action against a
city for injuries resulting from the city's interference with access to the owner's
store was denied because the damage resulted from a "temporary, one-time occurrence"-the
operation and maintenance of a drainage system during and after a
flood-rather than a "permanent, continuous, or inevitably recurring interference
with property rights." Id. a t 465. '
203. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244
(Utah 1990).
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causes a "permanent or recurring interference with property
rights"204will amount to a taking.205

3. Public use requirement
The third element of an inverse condemnation claim requires that the taking or damage be effected for the benefit of
the public, or for a legitimate public use. "[Dlamages which are
not a direct and necessary consequence of t h e . . . public use
are not recoverable in an inverse condemnation action."20"
"Damages arising out of the carelessness or negligence or indifference [of a state agency when acting] for public use are not
damages contemplated by the statutes as recoverable under the
principles of law pertaining to eminent domain proceedi n g ~ . This
" ~ ~principle
~
is best illustrated by several examples.
In O'Neill v. San Pedro, LA. & S.L.R. Co.?O8 the Utah
Supreme Court held that in an inverse condemnation action,
recovery is allowed only for injuries that "necessarily [arise]
from the proper and careful operation of the improvement."209
Any damages arising &om the railroad's negligent operation of
its trains were recoverable only in a negligence action.210In
Lund v. Salt Lake County?l1 a property owner sought to "recover damages for injury to certain fish ponds and [the] destruction of fish" caused by contaminated water released into
the ponds by Salt Lake County.212 The court denied the inverse condemnation claim, holding that "the damages for which

204. Colman, 795 P.2d at 627.
205. Id. In Board of Educ. v. Croft, 373 P.2d 697 (Utah 1962), the court provided this explanation of what amounted to "damagen under article I, section 22:
Damages to land, by the construction of a public or industrial impmvement, though no part thereof is taken as provided for under [Utah's eminent domain statute], . . . is limited to injuries that would be actionable
a t common law, or where there has been some physical disturbance of a
right, either public or private, which the owner enjoys in connection with
his property and which gives it additional value, and which causes him to
sustain a special damage with respect to his property in excess of that
sustained by the public generally.
Id. at 699.
206. Farmers, 803 P.2d a t 1245.
207. Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 49 P.2d 405, 407 (Utah
1935) (citation omitted).
208. 114 P. 127 (Utah 1911).
209. Id. at 130.
210. Id.
211. 200 P. 510 (Utah 1921).
212. Id. at 511.
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compensation is allowed under article I, $22, of the State Constitution are such as are the direct consequences of the lawful
exercise of the right of eminent domain, and that ordinarily
Because these damages
such damages are una~oidable."~'~
were not the direct result of a n eminent domain action, the
court found that the property was "not taken for a public
use."214
In two separate opinions, Justice Wade wrote that inverse
condemnation damages are limited to those necessarily arising
out of the public use. In Spring~ille~Banking
Co. v. Burton,215
Justice Wade wrote that inverse condemnation damages must
"grow out of" an intentional public use rather than merely
result from a negligent or wrongful state actionO2l6And in
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County:''
Justice Wade noted that
article I, section 22 "clearly requires the taking or damaging of
tangible private property, and that the public use . . . be intentional and not merely accidental or negligently caused."218

For years the United States Supreme Court failed to afford
substantive protection under the Fifth Amendment prohibition
against takings of private property or public use without just
compensation. This lack of constitutional protection stemmed
from the interrelation of two powers: the eminent domain power and the police power. The eminent domain power allows a
taking of private property but requires compensation. The
police power also effectively allows a taking, but, traditionally,
no just compensation is required even when land's value is
reduced. Because of the confusion surrounding the exercise of
these two powers, governments were tempted to achieve eminent domain goals through exercises of the police power, thereby effecting a taking without having to pay just compensation.
With the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal,
the Takings Clause was finally given a n active role in constitutional jurisprudence. Pennsylvania Coal recognized that exercises of the police power which go too far can constitute an

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 514.
Id. at 513.
349 P.2d 157 (Utah 1960).
Id. at 166 (Wade, J., concurring).
354 P.2d 105 (Utah 1960).
Id. at 110 (Wade, J., dissenting).
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unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has struggled to clearly
articulate exactly when an action has gone too far. While its
efforts have often been criticized, the Court has not completely
failed to articulate a logical body of law.
The development of the Utah Supreme Court's analysis of
the Utah Constitution's takings clause has paralleled that of
the United States Supreme Court. For many years the Utah
Supreme Court failed to give any substantial protection under
article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution in much the same
way that the United States Supreme Court failed to provide
landowners any protection under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Before its landmark decision in Colnan, the Utah
court had not recognized any significant protection under
Utah's takings clause. I n C o l m n , the court abandoned its longheld belief that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a
plaintiff from suing the state whenever the state had damaged
the plaintiffs property without just compensation. The court
decided that the Utah Constitution's takings clause requires a
self-executing remedy that cannot be circumvented by state
statute. Today, while the Utah analysis is not as detailed as its
federal counterpart, it at least provides the essential protection
of private property that was envisioned by the state's founders
and incorporated into the Utah takings clause.
David W. TuDs

